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The paper examines the economic role of modelling information on the decision problem of an exporting firm under 
exchange rate risk and hedging. Information is described in terms of market transparency, i.e., a publicly observable 
signal conveys more information about the random foreign exchange rate. We analyze the interaction between market 
transparency and the ex ante expected utility of the exporting firm. It is shown that more transparency on the foreign 
exchange market may result in higher or lower export production. 
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The uncertainty to which decision makers are exposed in a global economy depends
on the amount and the precision of information available to them. More reliable
information, e.g. about exchange rates, interest rates, prices, technology, or market
conditions, allows market participants to make better decisions. When the infor-
mation is of public nature, rather than privately owned by the individual, it will
be used by other agents, too. Under such circumstances the information may aect
endogenous market mechanisms (Burnside et al. (2001)).
The precision of information revealed to agents through an information system
has recently been conceptually linked to the notion of market transparency. The
policy oriented literature stresses the role of transparency for a functioning economy.
This paper suggests a dierent notion of transparency for the nancial market and
analyzes its role for the decision problem of an exporting rm under exchange rate
uncertainty. The risk averse exporting rm has access to a currency futures market
where it can hedge its net exposure connected with its export (see, for example,
Broll et al. (1999), Wong (2003)). Prices and contracts traded on the currency
forward market depend upon market transparency.
In our study the market transparency is linked to the informativeness of a pub-
licly observable signal which is correlated with the random foreign exchange rate.
The signal conveys some noisy information about the unknown exchange rate and,
therefore, allows the rm to update its beliefs. The uncertainty to which the export-
ing rm is exposed when it decides about resource allocation for production depends
on the observed signal as well as on the information system within which the signal
can be interpreted. We characterize the foreign exchange market as more trans-
parent if the signal conveys more precise information about the unknown foreign
exchange rate. Thus, more information means that the exchange rate uncertainty
is reduced through the disclosure of more reliable information.
In the literature there are mainly three analytical concepts measuring the de-
gree of information and proposing an order of the underlying information systems.
They were proposed by Blackwell (1953), Lehmann (1988), and Kim (1995). The
notion of transparency used in our study is adopted from the work by Drees and
2Eckwert (2003). They characterize market transparency by using a criterion which
is conceptually related to the literature that emerged from the seminal works by
Blackwell (1953). For other concepts of transparency that have been used in the
economic literature, see Heinemann and Illing (2002), Krebs (2005).
There is a large body of related literature which analyzes the welfare eects
of public information. When individuals make decisions in isloation from others,
more reliable information is generally benecial (Blackwell (1953)). Yet, more infor-
mation can have detrimental eects if the information aects risk sharing arrange-
ments in the economy (Hirshleifer (1971), (1975), Schlee (2001)) or if agents interact
strategically using private information and public information simultaneously (e.g.
Morris and Shin (2002)). In this paper we abstract from informational asymmetries
but we allow for some risk sharing through a competitive futures market. While
market transparency does not aect the risk premium on this market, it does have
implications for the amount of risks that will be shared in equilibrium.
We demonstrate that the impact of more precise information on the exporter's ex
ante expected utility depends on the degree of risk aversion and on the rm's tech-
nology. In particular, more transparency reduces the exporter's ex ante expected
utility, if the rm is highly risk averse and if marginal productivity is decreasing
rapidly. The exporting rm benets from more transparency on the foreign ex-
change market if it is moderately risk averse and/or marginal productivity is slowly
decreasing. We nd that more transparency may increase or decrease the export
production of the rm. The impact depends on the exporter's technology. It is also
shown that more transparency may result in less average output even though on
average more resources, i.e. labor, has been used in the production process.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a two period
model of the exporting rm's decision problem. We introduce the concept of market
transparency which underlies the analysis. Section 3 derives the main results. The
nal section concludes.
32. The model: export, hedging and information
We consider the model of a competitive risk averse exporting rm which extends
over two periods, t = 0;1. The rm employs labor, L, as an input factor for the
production of a homogenous good in period 0 and sells its product at a given world
price in foreign currency p per unit. The wage rate, w, is given. The foreign
exchange rate ~ e is random in t = 0. The tilde refers to the stochastic nature of
the exchange rate which assumes values in 
 = [e;e], where 0 < e < e < 1. The
production technology of the rm is described by a strictly concave function F(L)
with F 0(L) > 0;F 00(L) < 0. The rm has access to a currency forward market
where it can hedge the spot exchange rate risk.
Prior to the rm's decision on employment and hedging a publicly observable
signal s is realized. This signal is the realization of a random variable ~ s which
is correlated with the foreign spot exchange rate ~ e. Hence, the signal s contains
information about the unknown foreign exchange rate and, at the time when the
rm chooses labor input for export production, the relevant expectation for ~ e is the
updated (in a Bayesian way) posterior belief.
The currency forward market opens at date 0 after the signal has been observed.
In this market futures contracts are traded each of which involves the obligation on
the part of the seller to deliver e units of domestic currency to the buyer at date 1 if
the exchange rate turns out to be e. Let H denote the number of futures contracts
sold by the rm. We assume that the futures market is unbiased, which implies
that the futures market clears at a price ef(s), that is equal to the conditional mean
of a contract's payo, i.e. ef(s) = E[~ ejs]: Both the purchase price and the payo
of a futures contract fall due at time 1. The production decision is made after the
signal has been observed, but before the foreign exchange rate is known. Therefore,
the rm is subject to economic risk.
In order to hedge the risk exposure, the rm sells (buys) H units of the currency
forward on the futures market. The random operating prot of the rm is ~  =




4where U is a strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice continuously dieren-
tiable utility function. The rm maximizes the expected utility with respect to


























From these two equations we obtain the optimal level of labor input, L, and the
optimal forward commitment, H, as
ef(s)pF
0(L
) = w and H
 = pF(L
):
This implies that the optimal level of labor demand, L, is an increasing function
of ef(s). Due to unbiasedness of the futures market risks are fully hedged and,
consequently, the exporter's prot is certain:  = ef(s)pF(L)   wL.
We identify the transparency of the nancial market with the informativeness of
the signal s 2 S  R, which is publicly observable. The informativeness of the signal
depends on the information system within which signals can be interpreted. An
information system, denoted by g, species for each state of nature, e, a conditional
probability function over the set of signals: g(sje): The positive real number g(sje)
denes the conditional probability that the signal s will be observed if the true
exchange rate is e. The function g(sje) is common knowledge. Using Bayes's rule,
the rm revises its expectations and maximizes expected utility on the basis of the
updated beliefs.
Let  : 
 ! R+ be the density function for the prior distribution over 
. The





g(sje)(e)de for all s:
The density function for the updated posterior distribution over 
 is
(ejs) = g(sje)(e)=(s):
Blackwell (1953) suggested a criterion that ranks dierent information systems ac-
cording to their informational contents. Suppose g1 and g2 are two information
5systems with associated density functions 1() and 2(). The following criterion
induces an ordering on the set of information systems.
Denition Let g1 and g2 be two information systems. Information system g1 is
said to be more informative than information system g2 (expressed by g1 inf g2),















for all e 2 
.
According to this criterion, g1 inf g2 holds if g2 can be obtained from g1 through
a process of randomization. The probability density (s0;s) transforms a signal s
into a new signal s0. If the s0 values are generated in this way, the information
system g2 can be interpreted as being obtained from the information system g1 by
adding random noise. Note that (;) is independent of e. Therefore, the signals
under information system g2 convey no information about the value of ~ e that is not
also conveyed by the signals under information system g1.
Our notion of transparency in the foreign exchange market is based on the
informational content of the signal. A signal that conveys information about the
random spot exchange rate aects the conditional exchange rate uncertainty in
the economy. This conditional uncertainty may be hedged (partially or fully) by
an economic agent if risk sharing arrangements are available. Less conditional
uncertainty due to better information therefore does not necessarily imply that the
agent is exposed to less risk. In our model, for example, the rm eliminates any
conditional exchange rate risk from its prots through trade on the currency forward
market regardless of the signal's precision. We characterize the foreign exchange
market as more transparent if the signal, s, conveys more reliable information about
~ e. Thus, higher market transparency implies that the conditional exchange rate
uncertainty is reduced through the dissemination of more precise information. The
following Lemma 1 contains a property of information systems which can be used
in our analysis.
6Lemma 1 Let g1 and g2 be two information systems for the random exchange rate



















holds for every convex function G() on the set of density functions over 
. Note
1(js) and 2(js) are the posterior beliefs under the two information systems.
Lemma 1 implies that more transparency (weakly) raises the expectation of any
convex function of posterior beliefs. For concave functions the inequality is reversed.
A proof of Lemma 1 is developed in Kihlstrom (1984). In the next section we will
apply this property to examine the exporting rm's decision when there is more
transparency in the foreign exchange market.
3. Transparency, ex ante expected utility and export
What are the implications of more reliable information for the ex ante expected






















where the deterministic world price, p, is set equal to one. Our analysis focuses






. Since ef(s) is linear in the posterior state probabilities,
Lemma 1 implies
Proposition 1 More transparency on the foreign exchange market increases (de-
creases) ex ante expected utility of the exporting rm, if ^ U(ef) is convex (concave).
In order to link the implications of transparency on ex ante expected utility
we analyze under which conditions the value function ^ U(ef) is convex or concave.












7where  = 1=U0()F(L)2 > 0. The rst term on the RHS is negative due to risk
aversion of the rm. The second term is positive since the technology is concave.
The negative rst term (Hirshleifer eect) captures the ex ante expected utility
losses that result from the reduction of risk hedging opportunities: the currency
futures market allows the rm to hedge against that part of the exchange rate risk
that has not yet been resolved by the signal; i.e. the more informative the signal
is the smaller is the portion of risk that can be hedged through forward contracts.
Since the exporter is risk averse, this eect reduces the ex ante expected utility of
the rm. The loss in ex ante expected utility is larger if the rm is more risk averse.
The second term (Blackwell eect) represents the increase in ex ante expected
utility that results from the fact that the rm can make a better decision when
it acts in a more transparent market environment. This eect depends on the
concavity of the production function: the Blackwell eect is weak if F 00 is large in
absolute value, i.e., if marginal productivity declines quickly. And the Blackwell
eect is strong, if marginal productivity declines slowly. The consequence for ex
ante expected utility of more transparency on the exchange market are determined
by the interaction of the Blackwell eect and the Hirshleifer eect. If the rm is
highly risk averse and if the marginal productivity declines quickly, the Hirshleifer
eect dominates the Blackwell eect and, hence, more transparency is undesirable
from the perspective of the rm. By contrast, if the rm is moderately risk averse, or
even risk neutral, and/or the marginal productivity decreases slowly, the Blackwell
eect is dominant. In this case the rm benets from more market transparency.
For further discussions of these eects in dierent economic settings, see Schlee
(2001), Eckwert and Zilcha (2001), (2003).
It is worth pointing out that the (negative) Hirschleifer eect rests on the avail-
ability of risk sharing instruments on the foreign exchange market. In the absence
of risk sharing arrangements, or if risk sharing is possible only at inordinately high
costs, the Hirshleifer eect is absent or negligible and, hence, in this case trans-
parency has more favorable implications than in our analysis. It is also worth men-
tioning that in more general settings than the one used here higher transparency
may reduce the distortionary eects of moral hazard and adverse selection phenom-
8ena thereby enhancing overall economic welfare.
Next we analyze the interaction between employment, output for exports and
transparency of the foreign exchange market. Denoting by E(L) the ex ante ex-









where L(ef(s)) denotes labor demand in the optimum. We characterize the inter-
action between the expected level of labor employed and market transparency as
follows.
Proposition 2 More transparency in the foreign exchange market leads to higher





is monotone increasing (decreasing) in L in the relevant range.
Proof Referring to Lemma 1 and noting that ef(s) is linear in the posterior belief
(js), we need to show that under the condition of the proposition L(ef) is a convex



























is monotone increasing (decreasing) in L in the relevant range. q.e.d.
According to Proposition 2, more transparency reduces the ex ante expected
level of employment if F 00 is constant. If, in addition, the constant F 00 is small
in absolute value, more transparency will lead to higher ex ante expected utility.
By contrast, if F 00 is large, then ex ante expected utility will decline with more
transparency. This shows that, depending mainly on the production technology,
there may exist a positive or negative transparency-induced link between ex ante
expected utility and the ex ante expected employment level.











More transparency may either stimulate or reduce the average export volume of the
rm. Which case applies depends on the rm's production technology F(L).
Proposition 3 More transparency in the foreign exchange market leads to higher







is increasing (decreasing) in L on the relevant range.























(concave) in ef. The claim then follows from Lemma 1. q.e.d.
Depending on the production technology, the ex ante expected export volume
may either increase or decrease. In particular, our analysis does not conrm the
conjecture that more transparency in foreign exchange market necessarily promotes
export activity. It may even happen that the average employment level increases
with more transparency while, at the same time, average export production declines.
With more transparency, good signals lead to an additional increase in employment
and export production while bad signals cause an additional decline in employment
and output. However, the additional employment of labor at times when good sig-
nals are observed has low marginal productivity because the production technology
is concave. The increase in output is small. At times when bad signals are observed
labor has high marginal productivity. The decline in labor employment therefore
causes a large reduction in output. Thus, under a better information system more
labor will be employed when marginal productivity of labor is low, and less labor
will be employed when marginal productivity is high. This mechanism, which is
10strong if marginal productivity decreases quickly, may result in less ex ante expected
output under a more transparent system even though on average more labor has
been used in the production process.
In the special case where F 00 is constant the levels of ex ante expected employ-
ment and export production always move in the same direction as the degree of
transparency on the foreign exchange market changes. This follows immediately as
a corollary from Proposition 2 and 3. Our earlier discussion of the transparency-
induced link between ex ante expected utility and ex ante expected employment
therefore generalizes in an obvious way: the discussion also applies to the link
between ex ante expected utility and export production.
Under a more transparent system labor employment and production become
more volatile because they react more sensitively to changes in the signal. This is
because with more reliable signals the distribution of the forward rate ef(s) becomes
more spread out: the futures price combines the realization of the signal, s, with the
prior of ~ e, and it assigns more weight to the signal if the signal contains more reliable
information about the exchange rate ~ e. Therefore, a more reliable signal leads to a
futures price which is more dispersed as it is more sensitive to the realization of the
signal. Since employment and output decisions depend on the futures price they
become more dispersed, too.
4. Conclusions
This paper has suggested a theoretical framework for modelling information and
transparency in an open economy. Market transparency is at the center of the
current regulatory debate. We have modelled market transparency through the
precision of information signals correlated to an unknown future exchange rate.
The aim of our study is to discuss the economic implications of more transparency
in the foreign exchange market. As a main result of our analysis, we have shown
that under a more transparent system the ex ante expected utility of an exporting
rm may increase or decrease depending on the interaction between technological ef-
fects and risk sharing eects. Furthermore we have derived conditions under which
higher transparency increases or decreases the ex ante expected level of employ-
11ment and export production. Under special circumstances there exists an inverse
transparency-induced link between the ex ante expected levels of employment and
production.
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